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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff7Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20030617-CA

CARLOS MENDEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for riot, a third degree felony in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101 (1999), entered upon a guilty plea in the Second Judicial
District, Weber County, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Defendant claims that, before accepting a plea, a trial court must determine that
a defendant understands the evidence against him on charges the State has agreed to
dismiss or not file. Did the motion court plainly err when it denied defendant's motion to
withdraw without addressing this claim, which was not presented below, where no law
requires that the plea court make this determination?
To establish plain error, a court must show that error occurred, that error should
have been obvious to the trial court when it considered the motion to withdraw, and that

the error was harmful. See State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993); State v.
Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ^j 11 n.3, 86 P.3d 759. Error is not plain "where there is no
settled appellate law to guide the court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App.
1997).
2. Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not
provide him with police reports and discuss the evidence with him before he entered his
plea. Has defendant presented a record to support his claim?
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, "a defendant must first demonstrate
that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19, 12 P.3d 92
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d
681, 685 (Utah 1997)). "Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient
performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). A defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty plea must
show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, If 17, 26 P.3d 203 (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
Defendant "bears the burden of proof with respect to . . . preservation and
presentation of the record." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 17. "Where the record appears
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES
The following relevant rule is reproduced in the Addendum:
UtahR.Crim.P. 11.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with riot, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101 (1999). R. 1. On December 5, 2002, defendant waived
his right to a preliminary hearing and pled guilty. R. 17-18, 48 (transcript of plea
hearing). Defendant's statement indicates that, in exchange for his plea, the State agreed
not to "file any other charges, including murder as a co-conspirator." R. 25.
On January 9, 2003, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison
term not to exceed five years. R. 19-20. On January 14, defendant filed the first of two
motions to withdraw his guilty plea. See R. 29, 31. Following oral argument on the
matter, the trial court denied the motions. R. 38-39, 49:6. Defendant timely appealed.
R.41.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On September 21, 2002, defendant, Ivan Rios, Angelo Arvizo, and Joe Domingo,
members of the Ogden Trece gang, left a party and began walking north on Quincy
Avenue in Ogden. Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) at 2, 5, 10, 19.2 Defendant

This statement of the facts is based on the factual summary of the offense
contained in the pre-sentence investigation report. See PSI at 2-10.
The presentence investigation report is listed in the supplemental index, but has
been assigned no record number.
3

said that he wanted to steal a car. Id. at 10. As they continued walking, they saw a white
vehicle pulled over to the east side of the road. Id. at 9. Defendant asked Daniel
Montgomery, the driver, for a ride. Id. at 3, 9. According to defendant, Daniel "said
something stupid" and then drove away. Id. at 9. Defendant and the other gang members
continued walking north. Id.
Later, the white vehicle returned. Id. According to defendant, Daniel and two
other "white guys" got out, approached defendant and the other gang members, and asked
what they were doing in the area. Id. The gang members immediately became
aggressive. Id. at 5. Angelo said that Daniel's group "wanted to know if they were the
guys that were trying to steal the car" and that defendant said, "Yeah, I tried to, it was
me." Id at 10.
Defendant said that he and his group "talked back," asking, "What's up, fools, you
want to get crazy or what?" Id. at 9. Defendant stated that Daniel's group then started to
get back into their vehicle. Id. Defendant and his group, however, set about "dealing
with" Daniel and his friends. Id. Defendant was dealing with "a big guy on the
passenger side of the vehicle." Id. Defendant claimed that he "may have pushed him,"
but that he did nothing more. Id. Angelo, however, said that defendant "was swinging
on" one of Daniel's group. Id. at 10. Ivan Rios was "punching at [Daniel,] the driver of
the vehicle." Id. Angelo conceded that he pulled "a box cutter type knife" from his
pocket when pursuing Daniel and his friends. Id. at 10. One of the gang members briefly
held a knife to the throat of one of Daniel's friends. Id. at 5. Ivan Rios conceded that he

4

repeatedly stabbed Daniel with a butterfly knife after Daniel had returned to his vehicle
and was seated in the driver's seat trying to pull away. Id. at 8.
Daniel died as a result of the stab wounds. Id. at 4.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A defendant cannot voluntarily enter a plea without understanding the charges to
which he is pleading. A plea court should therefore ascertain that he understands those
charges. However, no law suggests that a defendant must understand the charges
dismissed or not filed as part of the plea bargain before he can voluntarily enter a plea.
Defendant therefore cannot show that the trial court plainly erred when it found that his
plea to riot was voluntary without ascertaining that he understood the elements of murder
and the evidence in support of the unfiled murder charge.
A defendant bears the burden of presenting a record to support his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. While defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for
not providing him with police reports and for not advising him of the evidence against
him before his plea, he has not presented a record upon which this Court can find either
that trial counsel was deficient or that his performance was prejudicial.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
THE MOTION COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR WHEN IT
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA TO
A RIOT CHARGE WITHOUT ASCERTAINING THAT, AT THE
TIME OF THE PLEA, HE UNDERSTOOD THE EVIDENCE
AGAINST HIM ON A MURDER CHARGE THE STATE AGREED
NOT TO FILE
Defendant claims that the plea court failed to establish that the plea was
voluntarily taken. Br. Appellant at 16. He claims "[specifically, [that] the court,
knowing that the only concession to the Defendant in the plea to the crime as charged in
the original information was the promise by the prosecution not to file a murder charge,
did not make an adequate record to ensure that the Defendant did in fact understand the
nature and value of any promises made to him" (internal quotation and underlining
omitted). Id. Defendant did not preserve this claim below and does not argue plain error
on appeal. This Court should therefore decline to address it. In any case, defendant has
presented no authority for his claim.
Background. Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing and pled guilty.
R. 17-18, 48. Defendant's statement indicates that, in exchange for his plea, the State
agreed not to "file any other charges, including murder as a co-conspirator." R. 25. Over
a month later, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term not to
exceed five years. R. 19-20.
Five days after sentencing, defendant filed the first of two motions to withdraw.
See R. 29, 31. Defendant claimed in his motion to withdraw only that he felt scared into
6

entering his plea. Id. At oral argument on the motion, counsel elaborated. Counsel
stated that the possibility that the State might "fil[e] some kind of action against
[defendant] that involved him in [the] murder" scared him and "[t]hat was the basis for
the plea negotiation." R. 49:2.
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw. R. 49:6. The judge observed that
most defendants feel some fear when facing charges that might be prosecuted in the
absence of a plea. Id. He nevertheless found that defendant had "entered a knowing and
voluntary plea." Id.
A.

Defendant has not preserved this claim.
"As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a

constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Richins,
2004 UT App 36, ^ 8, 86 P.3d 759 (internal quotation omitted). To preserve an issue for
appeal, a defendant "must enter an objection on the record that is both timely and
specific." State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993). "The objection must 'be
specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error' of which counsel [or
defendant] complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996) (additional
internal quotation deleted). "The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial court the first
opportunity to address a claim that it has erred," and, if necessary, to expeditiously
correct the error. Rangel, 866 P.2d at 611.

7

Failure to preserve a claim waives that claim on appeal "unless a defendant can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 11, 10 P.3d 346 Where a defendant does not argue that
"exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" justify review of an unpreserved issue, the
appellate courts will decline to review it. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5
(Utah 1995).
In this case, defendant moved to withdraw his plea, but he did not claim error
based on the court's failure to ascertain that he understood the evidence against him that
might support a charge of murder. Rather, he argued only that fear of a possible murder
charge motivated his plea. R. 29, 31, 49:2. Thus, defendant did not preserve the grounds
he now raises for his claim of error.
Moreover, defendant has not argued that the plea court plainly erred when it took
his plea to the riot charge without determining that he understood the evidence against
him on the murder charge. This Court should therefore decline to review defendant's
claim.
B.

Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court plainly erred when it did
not ascertain that he understood the evidence against him that might support
a charge of murder.
Defendant did not raise this claim below. Therefore, even if the court should

choose to excuse his failure to preserve, this Court will review his claim under a plain
error standard. See State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348,111, 57 P.3d 1139. To establish
plain error, a defendant must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court when it considered the motion to withdraw, and (3) the
8

error was harmful. See Olsen, 860 P.2d at 334; Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ^ 11 n.3.
Error is not plain "where there is no settled appellate law to guide the court." Ross, 951
P.2dat239.
Defendant claims that the plea court failed to establish that the plea was
voluntarily taken. Br. Appellant at 16. He claims "[specifically, [that] the court,
knowing that the only concession to the Defendant in the plea to the crime as charged in
the original information was the promise by the prosecution not to file a murder charge,
did not make an adequate record to ensure that the Defendant did in fact understand the
nature and value of any promises made to him" (internal quotation and underlining
omitted).3 Id. He apparently argues that a plea court has a duty to find that a defendant
understands the elements of every unfiled or dismissed charge and the quantum of
evidence available to support a conviction on those charges and that, absent that finding,
a court cannot determine that the plea is voluntary. Defendant did not point to any
precedent in support of this claim.
A plea of guilty must be made voluntarily. It must be made "without undue
influence or coercion, and with a clear understanding of what the charge is." Strong v.
Turner, 452 P.2d 323, 324 (Utah 1969). The plea must represent "a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant"; it must

Defendant misstates that State's concession. The State did not merely forego
filing a murder charge. Rather, the State agreed not to "file any other charges, including
murder as a co-conspirator." R. 25. Under the facts of this case, the State might
reasonably have filed assault, aggravated assault, manslaughter, and murder charges, and
may have sought gang enhancements.
9

be "the product of a free and rational choice." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31
(1970). In order to make a free and rational choice, a defendant should understand the
rights that he waives—"the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination," "the right to
a trial by jury," and "the right to confront [his] accusers." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 243 (1969). A plea cannot be "knowing and voluntary" unless the defendant is
aware of these rights. Moreover, "because a guilty plea is an admission of all the
elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Id.
Strict compliance with the requirements of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, creates a presumption that the defendant entered the plea voluntarily. State v.
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, *\ 11, 1 P.3d 1108. Among other things, strict compliance assures
that defendant knows of the rights he waives and the elements of the charge to which he
pleads. Id.; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). It also ensures that a factual basis exists for
the plea, which may be established by a defendant's admission of culpability or by a
showing that the prosecution "has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction" on the charges to which a defendant pleads. Id. at 11(e)(4)(B).
Neither case law nor rule 11 requires that, in addition to the above requirements,
the court establish that the defendant understands the elements of any additional charges
which the State agrees to dismiss or not file in exchange for a plea. See Utah R. Crim P.
11(e). Nor do they require that the court establish that the defendant understands the
quantum of evidence the State possesses on those charges. See id.

10

As defendant concedes, the trial court complied with rule 11(e). See Br. Appellant
at 8 ("At the plea hearing the trial court went through all the elements as set forth by Rule
11."). Defendant thus concedes that the trial court apprised defendant of the rights he
would waive by entering the plea and of the elements of the charge to which he pled.
Defendant thus also concedes that the trial court established a factual basis for the plea.
Defendant does not claim that he was subjected to "undue influence or coercion."
Turner, 452 P.2d at 324. He does not claim that he lacked "a clear understanding" of the
charge to which he pled. Id. He does not claim that he was unaware of "the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination," "the right to a trial by jury," and "the right to
confront [his] accusers." Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. These claims, if supported, would
establish involuntariness.
Rather, defendant claims that the trial court did not determine whether he
understood the nature and value of any promises made to him, i.e., whether he understood
the elements of murder and the quantum of the State's evidence on those elements.4

4

Defendant implies that he pled guilty "due to his lack of understanding of the
evidence against him on the threatened murder charge." Br. Appellant at 16. The record,
however, clearly shows that defendant did not move to withdraw his plea in the thirtyfive day period between entry of the plea and sentencing, but did move almost
immediately after sentencing. R. 17-20,29. This time frame suggests that defendant
moved to withdraw, not because he did not understand the evidence against him on the
murder charge, but because he was dissatisfied with his sentence.
11

Where defendant has provided no "settled case law" requiring the court to make such
determinations, defendant's plain error claim fails. Ross, 951 P.2d at 239.5

5

Defendant cites a number of cases that address illusory promises. See Br.
Appellant at 14-16 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); State v.
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 3055 57 P.3d 238).
None of these cases support defendant's claim that the trial court must ascertain a
defendant's knowledge of the elements of charges the State agrees to dismiss or not file
and of the evidence supporting those charges. The cases do illustrate, however,
circumstances in which a defendant can show that he did not enter a plea voluntarily
because he was misled by an illusory promise.
The prosecution's promise, given in exchange for a defendant's plea, may be
illusory where the promise cannot be fulfilled. See Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1274-75
(finding State's promise to recommend that judge sentence defendant to hospital, rather
than to prison, was illusory, where statute gave judge little discretion and State's
recommendation could have had no effect on judge's decision); State v. Norris, 2002 UT
App 305, Tf 11 (stating that State's promise that defendant could pursue a claim for
vindictive prosecution was improper where State could not fulfill that promise).
Moreover, a defendant may show that he entered a plea involuntarily because he
was coerced by the prosecution's improper threat to file or prosecute charges where no
possibility existed of a conviction on those charges. See Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 290,
297 (Ind. 2002) (stating that defendant must show that there was no "reasonable basis to
believe that [he or she] could have been convicted" of dismissed charges); see also State
v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 296 (Utah 1992) (concluding that promise was not illusory
where "trial court found that the prosecution had a good faith belief that [the defendant]
could be convicted" and where "a conviction . . . was possible").
Defendant, however, does not claim that the State's promise not to "file any other
charges, including murder as a co-conspirator" was illusory or that he was improperly
coerced by the threat of other charges. R. 25. Under the circumstances of this case,
defendant would have a difficult time demonstrating that no possibility existed of a
conviction on any other charge or even that no possibility existed of a conviction on the
murder charge.
12

II.
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
THAT TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT
WITH COPIES OF POLICE REPORTS OR OTHERWISE INFORM
HIM OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE OR THAT SUCH
FAILURE, HAD IT OCCURRED, WOULD HAVE BEEN
PREJUDICIAL
Defendant claims that trial counsel performed ineffectively, alleging that
trial counsel did not "provide [him] with copies of the police report[s]" or
otherwise "inform him of the evidence in the case" before he pled guilty. Br.
Appellant at 2, 21-22.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, "a defendant must first
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." Litherland, 2000 UT 76,
\ 19 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.
Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997)). "Second, the defendant must show that
counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome
of the case." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). In the context of a
challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea, a "'defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Martinez, 2001
UT 12, H 17, 26 P.3d 203 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
As appellant, defendant "bears the burden of proof with respect to [his]
appeal[], including the burdens attending the preservation and presentation of the
13

record." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 17. "[A]n appellate court will presume that
any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant
evidence of which defendant is aware." Id. "Where the record appears inadequate
in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id.
Defendant has not presented a record upon which this court can find either
that trial counsel was deficient or that the alleged deficient performance was
prejudicial. Defendant claims that he requested that defense counsel provide him
with police reports, apparently so that he could review them prior to making a
decision about whether or not to enter a plea. Br. Appellant at 21. Defendant
points to no record evidence to support either his claim that he asked for the
reports or his claim that trial counsel did not provide them. Defendant thus has not
shown that trial counsel performed deficiently.
Further, defendant points to nothing in the record that would support an
inference that the police reports may have contained exculpatory information that
would have caused him to decline the plea offer or to any record evidence that he
would, in fact, have declined the offer had he seen the reports. Defendant does not
even include the reports as part of the record. He has not shown a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's not having provided the police reports, he would
have gone to trial. Defendant thus has not shown that he was prejudiced. See
Martinez, 2001 UT 12, H 17.

14

Defendant also claims that trial counsel failed to "inform him of the
evidence in the case" before he entered his plea. Br. Appellant at 2. Defendant
has presented no record support for this claim. Thus, he has not shown that trial
counsel performed deficiently.
Further, defendant has not shown that counsel could have informed him of
any evidence other than the evidence of which he was aware based on his presence
during the offense. He has not shown that counsel could have informed him of
any evidence that would have affected his decision to plead guilty. Thus,
defendant has not shown that the counsel's alleged failure to apprise him of the
evidence was prejudicial. See Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^f 17.
Defendant has demonstrated neither that trial counsel was deficient nor that
counsel's alleged deficient performance was prejudicial. He therefore cannot
prevail on his ineffective assistance claim.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.

15
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ADDENDUM

Rule 11 Pleas
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives
counsel in open court The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer
with counsel
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill A
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity If a defendant refuses to plead or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial A defendant unable to make bail
shall be given a preference for an early trial In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of
the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until
the court has found
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire
counsel,
(2) the plea is voluntarily made,
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the
nght to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived,
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements,
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction,
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences,
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached,
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea, and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these
factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or
translated to the defendant
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under

Section 77-13-6
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of
a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclosure
of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea The judge may then indicate
to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty
and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse
determination of any specified pre-trial motion A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann
§77-16a-103
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
These amendments are intended to reflect current law without any substantive changes The addition of a requirement for a
finding of a factual basis in section (e)(4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and is in accordance with prior case law E g State v
Breckenndge, 688 P 2d 440 (Utah 1983) The rule now explicitly recognizes pleas under North Carolina v Alford 400 U S
25, 91 S Ct 160, 27 L Ed 2d 162 (1970), and sets forth the factual basis required for those pleas E g Willett v Barnes,
842 P 2d 860 (Utah 1992)
The amendments explicitly recognize that plea affidavits, where used, may properly be incorporated into the record when
the trial court determines that the defendant has read (or been read) the affidavit, understands its contents, and
acknowledges the contents State v Maguire, 830 P 2d 216 (Utah 1991) Proper incorporation of plea affidavits can save
the court time, eliminate some of the monotony of rote recitations of rights waived by pleading guilty, and allow a more
focused and probing inquiry into the facts of the offense, the relationship of the law to those facts, and whether the plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered These benefits are contingent on a careful and considered review of the affidavit by the
defendant and proper care by the trial court to verify that such a review has actually occurred
The final paragraph of section (e) clarifies that the trial court may, but need not, advise defendants concerning collateral
consequences of a guilty plea The failure to so advise does not affect the validity of a plea State v McFadden, 884 P 2d
1303 (Utah App 1994), cert denied, 892 P 2d 13 (Utah 1995)

